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AN EXERCISE IN JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: LIMITING 
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT UNDER THE ACT OF STATE 
DOCTRINE AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a legal dispute involving a foreign nation is submitted 
to a United States court, the adjudication of rights and liabilities 
may prove problematic. Two formidable barriers, the act of state 
doctrine1 and sovereign immunity,2 limit the court's ability to re-
solve disputes which question the legality of sovereign acts. The 
circumstances under which a United States court should exercise 
its jurisdiction to consider the merits of a claim involving the ap-
plication of domestic law to the acts of a foreign sovereign remains 
a controversial issue.3 
The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in International Assoc. of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (0PEC)4 rekindled the controversy concerning 
judicial restraint in cases which question the validity of a foreign 
nation's acts of state. In refusing to adjudicate the merits of the 
case, the District Court relied on the provisions of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).5 On appeal, the Court of Ap-
1. The act of state doctrine is defined as a self-imposed rule of judicial abstention 
under which a United States court is precluded from inquiring into the validity of a foreign 
act of state. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See infra discussion 
section III. 
2. Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law which requires that 
domestic courts refrain from asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. W. BISHOP, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 550 (1962). See infra discussion section IV. 
3. Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM.L. 
REV. 1247 (1977). Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A Further Inquiry; 11 
LOY. u. CHI. L. REV. 193 (1980). 
4. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). 
5. On the question of jurisdiction, the District Court concluded: "[i]n view of all the 
evidence presented, this court finds that the activity carried on by the defendant OPEC 
member nations is not 'commercial activity;' that, therefore, defendants are entitled to im-
munity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act)." 477 F. Supp. 553, 569. 
See infra section VI. 
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peals exercised similar deference, but on an alternative theory-
the act of state doctrine.6 The OPEC case focuses renewed atten-
tion on the doctrinal bases underlying the act of state doctrine and 
sovereign immunity. Consequently, the decision's impact on the 
scope of judicial restraint deserves inquiry. 
This Note will focus on the reasoning applied by the Court of 
Appeals in granting OPEC immunity under the act of state doc-
trine. After introducing the factual circumstances giving rise to 
IAM's claim, the Note will trace the development and application 
of both the act of state doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act.7 Finally, this Note will undertake a critical analysis 
and evaluation of the rationale applied by each court in disposing 
of the antitrust claim against the OPEC nations. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
The defendant, OPEC,8 currently composed of thirteen 
petroleum producing and exporting nations,9 was first organized 
in 1960.10 At that time, petroleum producing countries lacked the 
ability to coordinate oil production.11 Foreign oil companies held 
exclusive authority over the output, production and pricing of oil.12 
During the fifties, the oil companies, faced with mounting oil 
reserves and increasing demand, engaged in competitive pricing.13 
6. 649 F.2d at 1362. See infra discussion section VII. 
7. Although the focus of this Note is on the act of state doctrine, an understanding of 
sovereign immunity is necessary to appreciate the problems faced in cases involving the 
acts of foreign sovereigns and extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
8. The plaintiff, IAM, sued both OPEC, the organization, and its thirteen member . 
nations individually, for alleged price-fixing activities. The failure to properly serve OPEC, 
the organization, however, resulted in its dismissal as a defendant. Thus, the trial was 
directed at the remaining complaint, a suit for injunctive relief against the thirteen in-
dividual OPEC nations. 477 F. Supp. at 553. 
9. OPEC is comprised of the following members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates. See R. STONE, OPEC AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPACT OF OIL ON SOCIETAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1977). 
10. S. MANOHARAN, THE OIL CRISIS: END OF AN ERA 55 (197 4). 
11. The oil resources of the Middle East were, until the late 1950s, almost wholly 
developed under exclusive concessions granted before World War II to companies controlled 
by eight foreign parent companies. The concessions covered most or all of the territories of 
the countries and ran for long periods, usually between 60 and 75 years. S. SCHURR & P. 
HOMAN, MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD 13 (1971). 
12. Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil In-
dustry, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 774, 779 (1973). 
13. Id. See Jensen, International Oil-Shortage, Cartel or Emerging Resource 
Monopoly, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335 (1974). 
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In 1960, downward pressure on market demand forced the oil com-
panies to cut their prices, resulting in substantial losses to host-
government revenues. 14 To meet this threat to revenues, the host-
governments formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in an effort to coordinate and stabilize the price 
of crude oil15 "free from all unnecessary fluctuations." 16 To achieve 
this goal, the member states established a system of voluntary 
production limits and royalties. 17 Currently, OPEC's oil is produced 
and exported through government-owned companies or through 
government participation in private companies.18 
The plaintiff, JAM, is a non-profit labor association whose 
members work in petroleum-consuming industries.19 JAM, disturb-
ed by the high price of oil and petroleum products,20 alleged that 
the increased oil prices resulted from OPEC's price-setting activi-
ties.21 Accordingly, JAM sued OPEC under section I of the Sher-
man Act22 for illegal price-fixing.23 Price-fixing, an arrangement 
14. After World War II, host governments were given a greater share of corporate 
profits through fixed royalty payments, amounting to 50 percent of the concessionaires' 
profits. "With the governments' revenues tied to profit, total revenues now depended on 
the concessionaires' decision on pricing." See Note, supra note 12, at 778. "The oil com-
panies unilaterally reduced the oil prices first in 1959 ... , leading to a sharp decline in the 
government per barrel revenue. Per barrel revenue declined from 84.6 cents in 1958 to 75.6 
cents in 1961." S. MANOHARAN, supra note 10, at 50. 
15. This goal was stated as: "[T]he unification of petroleum policies for Member 
Countries and the determining of the best means for safeguarding the interests of Member 
Countries individually and collectively." Resolutions Adopted at the Conference of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Resolution 1.2(4). 
1~. Id., Resolution 1.1. 
17. See Zakariya, New Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum 
Resources in Developing Countries, 9 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 545 (1974). 
18. See Note, supra note 12, at 793-814. 
19. 649 F.2d at 1355. "[L]ike most Americans, they [IAM] are consumers of gasoline 
and other petroleum-derived products." Id. 
20. Dramatic increases in oil prices began in the early 1970s. On October 16, 1973, the 
Persian Gulf producers met in Kuwait and unilaterally raised posted oil prices by 70 per-
cent. On January 1, 1974, OPEC raised posted prices further by 130 percent. G. CHANDLER, 
OIL-PRICES AND PROFITS 15, table 2 (1975). "Within two years, the price of crude oil had 
quadrupled." Id. 
21. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive 
Relief and Damages for Sherman Act Violations. Id. at 569. 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section provides in part: "Every contract, combination ... 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal." 
23. 477 F. Supp. at 558. Horizontal price-fixing violates§§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act 
which proscribes concerted action in restraint of trade, and § 5 of the FTC Act which pro-
hibits unfair methods of competition in or affecting price-fixing. J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16A 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: ANTI-TRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 6A-1 (1981). See 
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between two or more competitors aimed at controlling market 
prices, is conclusively presumed by the courts to be illegal per se.24 
Claiming injury from high oil prices,25 IAM sought injunctive relief 
and damages.26 
The defendants, OPEC and the thirteen individual nations, 
refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction and failed to appear in 
the proceedings.27 Various amici curiae argued OPEC's case, 28 
which was subsequently limited to the suit for injunctive relief 
against the thirteen OPEC member nations.29 The District Court 
granted judgment in favor of the defendants based on the FSIA.30 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's decision to dismiss the suit against the defendants, 
but this time under the act of state doctrine.31 
Ill. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
The act of state doctrine represents a policy of judicial 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1926); Keifer Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
24. Price-fixing is deemed so anticompetitive and contrary to public policy "that it is 
conclusively presumed to be illegal under the antitrust laws without further inquiry." VON 
KALINOWSKI, supra note 23. The seminal case applying the per se approach to condemn 
price-fixing is United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass 'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
In 1940, the Court reaffirmed and expanded the per se approach of Trans-Missouri in 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In Socony, the Court declared 
that "[u]nder the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of 
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity ... is illegal per 
se." Id. at 221. 
25. See supra note 21. 
26. 477 F. Supp. at 560. The plaintiffs asked for damages under§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 
and injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 16 (1973). 
27. 477 F. Supp. at 575. The District Court's inability to automatically enter a default 
judgment against the non-appearing defendants compounded the plaintiff's claim. Under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1608(e), the court cannot enter a default judgment 
automatically upon failure or refusal of a foreign sovereign to appear after being served. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976). 
28. 477 F. Supp. at 567. The counsel for amicus curiae were the Indonesia-U.S. 
Business Committee for the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and the Concerned Black 
Americans in Support of Africa and the Middle East. For the arguments raised by counsel, 
see infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text. 
29. Early in the proceedings, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for 
damages. "Since the plaintiff did not allege or show that it purchased any crude oil or 
gasoline from the defendants, ... it necessarily had to be and was and is an 'indirect pur-
chaser' of and from the defendants." 477 F. Supp. at 560-61. The Supreme Court held that a 
plaintiff in a price-fixing case may recover only if it purchased directly from the alleged 
price-fixer. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
30. 477 F. Supp. at 575-76. See infra discussion section Vl(B). 
31. 649 F.2d at 1361-62. See infra discussion section VII. 
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abstention from examining the propriety of acts taken by foreign 
governments within their sovereign territory .32 The doctrine's 
underlying rationale rests upon both the respect afforded to in-
dependent sovereign states33 and the allocation of functions among 
the branches of government under the "separation of powers" 
principle.34 The deferential nature of the doctrine, however, does 
not deprive a court of its jurisdiction to hear the dispute.35 Nor 
does its application evince the court's acceptance of the foreign 
sovereign's authority over the disputed acts.36 Rather, the doc-
trine simply removes certain sensitive issues from judicial con-
sideration,37 in deference to the executive's control over foreign 
policy.38 
A. Origins and Development 
The traditional formulation of the doctrine by an American 
court is found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 39 where Chief Justice 
Fuller said for a unanimous Court: 
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of 
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed 
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.40 
32. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
33. "Bringing a state without its consent before a foreign court and, especially, apply-
ing coercive measures ... will always amount to a direct violation of its sovereignty." M. 
BOGUSLAVSKIJ, STAATLICHE lMMUNITAT 40-44 (Rathfelder trans. 1965), translated into 
English in w. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN, R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIAL 663-664 (1969). 
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
35. Id. at 420. 
36. Id. at 421. The forum state, in applying the act of state doctrine, "merely declines 
to adjudicate or make applicable its own law to parties or property before it." Id. 
37. The Supreme Court explained in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 
(1917): 
The rule ... does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. 
It requires only that, when ... the foreign government has acted in a given way ... , 
the details of such action cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts . 
. . . To accept a ruling authority ... is not a surrender of jurisdiction but is an exer-
cise of it. 
38. Id. at 423. This adherence to "separation of powers ... concerns the competency of 
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of in-
ternational relations." Id. 
39. 168 u .s. 250 (1897). 
40. Id. at 252. 
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With sovereignty as a guiding principle, the Court was provided 
with a sound basis for refusing to consider the validity of the ac-
tions challenged in this case. Although Underhill involved the ac-
tions of a military commander representing a de facto ·govern-
ment,41 the principle of immunity developed by the Court remain-
ed applicable. The Supreme Court concluded that the acts of a de 
facto government, subsequently recognized by the United States, 
would be given presumptive validity by American courts.42 
Subsequently, two notable cases with facts similar to those in 
Underhill,, Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 43 and Ricaud v. American 
Metal Co. ,44 reaffirmed the Underhill doctrine in unequivocal 
terms.45 Relying on the precedent established in the Underhill, 
Ricaud, and Oetjen cases, the courts in subsequent cases applied 
the doctrine under varying circumstances.46 From these cases 
developed the basic elements needed to support the act of state 
doctrine, which include: 1) public acts of sovereignty;47 2) under-
41. The defendant, General Hernandez, commanded the Venezuelan revolutionary army 
which overthrew the existing government. Underhill, the plaintiff, a United States citizen liv-
ing in Venezuela, was denied an exit passport by Hernandez. This action was brought by 
Underhill for unlawful confinement and assault. Before the claim was adjudicated, however, 
the United States recognized the revolutionary forces as the legitimate government of 
Venezuela. Id. 
42. Id. at 254. The Court explained: "The immunity of individuals from suits brought 
in foreign tribunals .. . in the exercise of government authority, whether as civil officers or 
as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of government, ruling by 
paramount force ... . " Id. 
43. 246 U.S. 297 (1917). This case involved the seizing of hides from a Mexican citizen 
by General Villa, acting under the direction of General Carraza, whose regime was subse-
quently recognized by the United States. The plaintiff, assignee of the original owner, claim-
ed the defendant received the hides in violation of the Hague Convention. The Court ap-
plied the Underhill rationale, to uphold the actions of the de facto government and deny 
plaintiff's claim. Id. 
44. 246 U.S. 304 (1917). This case involved the seizing of lead bullion for General Car-
ranza's forces. The expropriated property, however, belonged to a United States citizen. 
Again, relying on the Underhill-Oetjen rationale, the Court denied the plaintiff's claim and 
the actions were given presumptive validity. 
45. 246 U.S. at 303 citing Underhill v. Hermandez, see supra note 39. See also 246 U.S. 
at 309. 
46. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (expropriation of 
property); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (antitrust claim for 
seizure of plantation); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E .B. Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (confiscated trademark). 
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 41 
(1965). This section provides in part: "[A] court in the United States, having jurisdiction . . . 
to determine a claim ... will refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state by 
which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests." Id. 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 15
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/15
1982] Exercising Judicial Restraint 385 
taken by a recognized foreign government exclusively within its 
own territory .48 
B. Sabbatino and the "New Rationale" 
In the 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 49 
the United States Supreme Court formulated a modern rationale 
to support the foundations of the act of state doctrine. Rejecting 
the notion that the doctrine is compelled solely by the inherent 
nature of sovereignty,50 the Court found that the doctrine also 
"arises out of the basic relationships between branches of govern-
ment in a system of separation of powers."51 Recognizing the possi-
ble adverse consequences of a court's passing upon the validity of 
foreign acts of state,52 the Court held that the doctrine's "continu-
ing vitality depends upon its capacity to reflect the proper distrib-
ution of functions between the judicial and political branches of 
the government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."53 
Under this rationale, the Court identified two factors to be 
considered in determining the doctrine's applicability to a par-
ticular situation.54 These balancing factors include the degree of 
consensus concerning international legal principles controlling the 
dispute,55 and the impact of a judicial resolution on an issue of 
foreign policy.56 Thus, the Court avoided "laying down or reaffirm-
48. Id. §§ 42-43. 
49. 376 u .s. 398 (1964). 
50. Id. at 421, citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, and American Banana Co. 
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347. The Court went on to state that "[w]hile historic notions of 
sovereign authority to bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they do 
not dictate its existence." Id. 
51. Id. at 423. See supra note 38. 
52. Id. at 431. The Court explained that "[p]iecemeal dispositions involving the proba-
bility of affront to another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on 
by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an agree-
ment that could otherwise be reached." Id. at 431-32. 
53. Id. at 427-28. 
54. Id. at 428. 
55. Id. The Court noted: "It should be apparent that the greater the degree of 
codification ... concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is 
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it .... " Id. 
56. Id. at 432. 
If the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with an expropriating country, 
but has refrained from claims of violations of the law of nations, a determination to that ef-
fect by a court might be regarded as a serious insult, while a finding of compliance with in-
ternational law would greatly strengthen the bargaining hand of the other state with conse-
quent detriment to American interests. Id. 
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ing an inflexible and all encompassing rule."57 Applying these fac-
tors to the dispute at hand, the Court upheld the Cuban expropria-
tion.58 
Critics of Sabbatino, however, were opposed to the Court's 
application of the act of state doctrine.59 Congress subsequently 
enacted the "Hickenlooper Amendment" 60 in an effort to limit the 
scope of the doctrine in future cases.61 The effect of the amend-
ment was to achieve a "reversal of presumptions."62 The amend-
ment now required the courts to consider the merits of cases in-
volving foreign confiscations violative of international law .63 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ACT 
OF STATE DOCTRINE 
A. Dunhill and the "Commercial Exception" 
Owing to recent developments in the expansion of commercial 
activities undertaken by foreign nations,64 the United States em-
braced a "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity. 65 Under this 
57. Id. at 428. The Court went on to state: "[W]hether forebearance by an American 
court in a given situation is advisable or appropriate depends upon the balance of relevant 
considerations." Id. See supra notes 52, 55, 56. 
58. 376 U.S. at 428. 
59. Particularly opposed to the Sabbatino decision has been the State Department. 
"In general this Department's experience provides little support for a presumption that ad-
judication of acts of foreign states in accordance with relevant principles of international 
law would embarrass the conduct of foreign policy." Letter from the State Department, 
Washington, Nov. 26, 1975, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
710 (1976). The legislative branch's discontent with Sabbatino was also expressed. See infra 
note 60 and accompanying text. 
60. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The Amendment provides in part: "[N]o court in the 
United States shall decline on the grounds of the federal act of state doctrine to make a 
determination on the merits ... in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property 
is asserted by any party including a foreign state ... " Id. 
61. See [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3829, CoNF. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 
Id. 
62. Id. The Advisory Committee explained this reversal of presumptions. 
Under the Sabbatino decision, the courts would presume that any adjudica-
tion as to the lawfulness under international law of the act of a foreign state would 
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy .... Under the Amendment, the Court 
would presume that it may proceed with an adjudication on the merits unless the 
President states officially that such an adjudication in the particular case would 
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy. 
63. See supra notes 60, 62. 
64. See B. WESTON, R. FALK AND A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 
809 (1980). See also T. GIUTTARI. THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 216-34 (1970). 
65. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
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theory, a foreign state's involvement in purely commercial ac-
tivities would not enjoy the immunity previously extended under 
prevailing judicial principles.66 The Supreme Court attempted to 
reconcile the restrictive theory with the act of state doctrine in 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 67 
In Dunhill, the Court refused to grant immunity under the act 
of state defense for Cuban nationalization of the business assets of 
five leading cigar manufacturers.68 The Court recognized that the 
"concept of an act of state should not be extended to include the 
repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owned by a foreign 
sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities."69 Cogni-
zant of the principles underlying the restrictive theory, the Court 
concluded: "we are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act 
of state the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments in 
order to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the Executive 
Branch."70 In doing so, the Court announced a "commercial act" ex-
ception to the act of state defense. 71 Justice Stevens' failure to con-
cur with this exception,72 however, resulted in a plurality opinion. 73 
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 69 (1965). 
This theory requires the court to grant immunity to claims arising from a foreign nation's 
public or governmental acts, but not those commercial in nature. See infra notes 102-04 and 
accompanying text. 
67. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
68. Id. This case involved former owners of Cuban cigar companies suing certain U.S. 
importers of cigars for trademark infringement and the purchase price of cigars sold by the 
manufacturers to the importers. The companies had been seized by the Castro government 
but continued to ship cigars to the importers. The former owners claimed that the 
shipments belonged to them and asserted their rights to recover the amounts paid for the 
cigars. The claimants also demanded recovery for amounts paid by the importers to the in-
tervenors for shipments sold prior to the intervention. Each importer, except Alfred 
Dunhill of London, Inc., owed more to the intervenors than they had paid. Dunhill, however, 
had paid an additional $55,000 for pre-intervention shipments. Id. 
Id. 
69. Id. at 698. The Court reasoned that: 
[R]epudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this restrictive ap-
proach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it were, foreign 
governments, by merely repudiating the debt before or after its adjudication, 
would enjoy an immunity which our Government would not extend them under 
prevailing sovereign immunity principles. 
70. 425 U.S. at 697. 
71. Id. at 706. "Acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely 
commercial operations will no longer be considered acts of state." Id. 
72. Id. at 715. (Stevens, J ., concurring). This opinion states: "For reasons stated in 
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I agree that the act of state doctrine does not bar the 
entry of the judgment in favor of Dunhill." Id. (The "exception" was described in Part III). 
73. Id. 
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Thus, the precedential value of the "commercial exception" to the 
act of state doctrine remains in question.74 
B. Timberlane and the "Balancing Approach" 
Recent applications of the act of state defense involved claims 
based on foreign antitrust violations under the Sherman Act. 75 
The impact of extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws are 
a matter of concern for the judiciary, 76 as such "broad assertions of 
authority" may seriously intrude upon foreign states' interests.77 
Indeed, many affected nations have resented and protested such 
intrusion,78 or simply refused to recognize the courts' exercise of 
jurisdiction.79 Thus, the courts sought to establish modern 
methods which reflect the interests of both the United States and 
foreign states in antitrust litigation.80 
Recognizing the foreign and domestic implications involving 
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, the courts attempted to 
balance the competing interests involved in judicial intervention 
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.81 The Court in 
7 4. H. BLACK, LA w OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 10 (1912). Under the classical theory of 
precedent, the lack of a clear majority rationale in support of the judgment deprived the 
judgment of all precedential value, and the decision was authority for the result only. Id. 
The Second Circuit, however, has applied the Dunhill exception as authority. See Hunt v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Note, The Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980). 
75. The act of state doctrine was first applied in an antitrust case in American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See, Bloch, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. 
Courts in Sherman Act Cases, 54 A.B.A.J. 781, 782 (1968). See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. 
v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon 
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61. 
77. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LA ws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 365-72 (2d 
ed. 1970); Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of American Antitrust Laws, 3 AM. Bus. L.J. 
163, 165-69 (1965). 
78. See A. NEALE, supra note 77. 
79. A classic example occurred in the OPEC case herein, 477 F. Supp. 553. See supra 
note 9. 
80. The need for a "balancing of interests" was noted by Michael J. Egan, Associate 
Attorney General, Justice Department, in an address given on November 3, 1977, reprinted 
in VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 23 at 5.04(1), n.7. He identified two "fundamental sources of 
tension" that result from antitrust enforcement: 
1) United States law and policy seek to prevent anticompetitive behavior in 
situations in which some foreign laws and policies permit and even require it; 
2) Some foreign governments question the appropriateness of our application 
of United States law to persons residing and acts taking place within their ter-
ritory. Id. 
81. 549 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1976). The plaintiffs, Timberlane Corp., alleged that officials 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 15
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/15
1982] Exercising Judicial Restraint 389 
Timberlane overruled the District Court's dismissal of the alleged 
conspiracy82 and announced the elements to be weighed in deter-
mining whether United States interests support the exercise of 
jurisdiction.83 According to the Court, the requisite elements in-
clude: 
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the na-
tionality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or 
principal places of business of corporations, the extent to 
which enforcement by either state can be expected to 
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on 
the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the 
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect 
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and 
the relative importance to the violations charged of con-
duct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.84 
When a court determines that the balance tips in favor of 
United States interests, the act of state doctrine is inappropriate 
to preclude the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws.85 
Conversely, when the balancing test demonstrates that judicial 
determination would involve an intemperate invasion into foreign 
policy ,86 or insult sovereign authority ,87 the act of state defense is 
properly upheld.88 
of the Bank of America conspired to prevent the plaintiff from milling lumber in Honduras 
and exporting it to the United States. The Honduran lumber export business consequently 
remained under the control of individuals, financed and controlled by the Bank, in violation 
of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The District Court dismissed the action under the act of 
state doctrine. Id. at 600-01. 
82. Id. at 615. 
83. See infra text accompanying note 84. 
84. Id. at 614. See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 
(1958). 
85. 549 F.2d at 614-15. The Timberlane court applied these factors and concluded: 
r1Jt is clear that most of the activity took place in Honduras, ... and that the most 
direct economic effect was probably on Honduras. However, there has been no in-
dication of any conflict with the law or policy of the Honduran government, nor 
any comprehensive analysis of the relative connections and interests of Honduras 
and the United States. Under these circumstances, the dismissal by the district 
court cannot be sustained .... Id. 
86. See supra notes 52, 56. 
87. 549 F.2d at 613. 
88. Id. 
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V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law89 under 
which domestic courts abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a 
foreign state.90 The doctrine's underlying rationale is based on 
each nation's respect for the sovereignty of foreign states.91 Under 
this doctrine, the principle of "independent equality between 
states"92 is preserved by granting a foreign nation immunity from 
liability despite the domestic court's ability to establish jurisdic-
tion.93 
A. Origins and Development 
Total immunity, characterized as the "absolute theory," 
prevents a foreign court from exercising jurisdiction over another 
sovereign regardless of the nature of the acts in question.94 This 
theory was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden. 95 In Schooner, the Court held that interna-
tional law prohibits a domestic court from asserting jurisdiction 
over a foreign sovereign without that nation's consent.96 Chief 
89. The Christina [1938] A.C. 485, 502. Lord Wright stated that the principle of 
sovereign immunity is "sometimes said to flow from international comity or courtesy, but 
may now more properly be regarded as a rule of international law." Id. See 22 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 117, 127 (Spec. Supp. 1928) reprinted in T. GIUTTARI, supra, note 64 at 4. 
90. T. GIUTTARI, supra note 89, at 5. Theoretically, the rationale for sovereign immuni-
ty developed from traditional concepts of nineteenth century international law. In that 
period, the state possessed absolute sovereignty, exclusive territorial jurisdiction, and legal 
equality among the nations. Possessing such attributes, each state could not be subjected to 
the jurisdiction of another state. Id. See also w. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 531 (1971). 
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 65 
(1965). 
91. W. BISHOP, supra note 90, at 500. 
92. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66 (1825). See also I. L. OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW§ 70 (5th ed. 1937). 
93. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,§ 66. Unlike the act of state defense, 
however, sovereign immunity may not be claimed by a private litigant; it is limited solely to 
a foreign government, its agents, or instrumentalities. Id. 
94. T. GIUTTARI, supra note 90, at 9. Under the "absolute theory" of sovereign im-
munity a foreign government cannot be sued "[i]n the courts of other nations without its 
consent regardless of the activities involved." Id. During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, the granting of absolute immunity to all governments was generally accepted by 
most nations. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 168-69 (8th ed. 1866). 
95. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
96. Id. at 137. The Court stated: 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by obliga-
tions of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing 
himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed 
to enter a foreign territory in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his 
12
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Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated: "This 
full absolute territorial jurisdiction being incapable of conferring 
extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign 
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects."97 The 
Schooner approach to sovereign immunity was generally accepted 
by domestic courts until the mid-1900s.98 
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court recognized that cases involv-
ing sovereign immunity directly affect our relations with the 
foreign government involved.99 The Court reasoned that because 
the political branches of government are charged with the conduct 
of foreign affairs, controversies involving foreign nations are best 
handled "through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the com-
pulsions of judicial proceedings." 100 As a result, the Court now 
gave conclusive effect to State Department suggestions on the 
disposition of cases involving claims of sovereign immunity.101 
During this period, however, the nature and character of a 
sovereign changed dramatically. As foreign governments became 
increasingly involved in commercial activities and moved away 
from their traditional roles, a shift from absolute immunity took 
place. Most nations began to embrace a restrictive approach to 
sovereign immunity .102 According to this restrictive theory, "the 
immunity of a sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or 
public acts of a state, but not with regard to private acts." 103 
In 1952, the State Department adopted the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity as official United States policy in the so-
called "Tate Letter ."104 Its adoption was based in part on the ra-
Id. 
independent sovereign station ... are received by implication, and will be extend-
ed to him. 
97. Id. 
98. See Berrizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Compania Espanola de 
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). 
99. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 
U.S. 30 (1945). 
100. 324 U.S. at 35. The Court in Hoffman explained: "[i]n such cases the judicial 
department of this government . . . will not embarrass the latter by assuming an an-
tagonistic jurisdiction." Id. 
101. Id. at 35. The Court stated: "It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity 
which. our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which 
the government has not seen fit to recognize." Id. 
102. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
103. See infra note 104, at 985. 
104. Letter of May 19, 1952, from the State Department Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. 
Tate to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, reported in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 
(1952). 
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tionale "that the wide-spread and increasing practice on the part 
of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes 
necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business 
with them to have their rights determined in court." 105 Difficulties 
were encountered, however, as no guidelines in determining im-
munity questions were developed by the State Department.106 This 
problem was exacerbated by State Department inconsistencies 
- silence on immunity questions in certain politically uncomfort-
able cases and strict demands in politically favorable cases.107 
Although the theoretical basis of restrictive sovereign immunity 
was clearly established, apolitical application under recognized 
legal principles remained elusive. 
The executive branch subsequently began to recognize it was 
"ill-suited" for the task of resolving sovereign immunity 
questions. 108 Indeed, in 1973, both the State Department and the 
Justice Department jointly introduced a bill seeking restrictions 
on their roles in cases involving the application of sovereign im-
munity .109 The drawbacks associated with restrictive immunity 
under the guidance of the executive branch provided a motivating 
105. Id. at 984-85. "[I]t will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests for a grant of immunity." 
Id. The State Department's reasons for this policy change included: "1) the increased inter-
national acceptance of the restrictive theory, and the feeling that if the United States was 
allowing itself to be sued in other countries on that theory, its courts should have jurisdic-
tion over foreign sovereigns; 2) the recognition that communist countries benefited from the 
absolute theory .... " Id. 
106. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 168 (1946); Note, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The State 
Department as the Supreme Court of International Law, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968); Lyons, 
The Conclusiveness of the Suggestion and Certification of the American State Department, 
24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 116 (1947). 
107. In those cases where the State Department remained silent, inconsistent conclu-
sions resulted. Compare, Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974) (governmental purchase of military equipment given immunity based on the purpose 
of the commercial transaction) with Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General De 
Abastecimientos y Transports, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) 
(applying the nature of the activity test in determining sovereign immunity claim by 
Spanish government after plaintiff sought arbitration for damage to ship). In politically sen-
sitive cases, the State Department used suggestions of immunity for other objectives. See 
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (exchange of a suggestion of im-
munity for the return of a hijacked airliner). 
108. Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973). · 
109. Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978). 
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force behind the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act. 110 
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
In 1976, Congress, in an effort to free the judiciary from 
dependence on the executive branch111 and bring the United States 
into conformity with other nations, 112 enacted the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).113 Viewed broadly, the Act 
sought to establish four basic goals: 1) to codify the restrictive 
theory of immunity, 114 2) to depoliticize immunity determinations 
by recommitting them to the judiciary, 115 3) to establish a 
statutory procedure for obtaining in personam jurisdiction over 
foreign states,116 and 4) to produce methods to ensure the execu-
tion of judgments.117 
The legislative history of the Act indicates Congress' desire 
to remedy the drawbacks associated with executive interference 
in sovereign immunity cases.118 The FSIA eliminated the State 
Department as the primary decisionmaking body and established 
a system for the judicial determination of sovereign immunity 
questions. 119 Under the Act, litigants are assured that immunity 
decisions are made by the courts under established legal prin-
ciples in a politically neutral environment.120 
110. See infra note 115. 
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976). See Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. 126-27 (1976). 
112. The legislative history of the FSIA recognized the practices of other nations. Under 
the Act, "U.S. immunity practice would conform to the practice in virtually every other coun-
try-where sovereign immunity questions are made exclusively by the courts .... " [1976] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, 6604, 6606. 
113. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). 
114. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6604. 
115. Id. at 6605. 
116. Id. at 6606. "A motivating force behind the bill was ... to transfer the determina-
tion of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reduc-
ing the foreign policy implications and assuring litigants these often crucial decisions are 
made on purely legal ground and under procedures that insure due process." Id. 
117. Section 2 of the bill adds a new section 1330 to Title 28 of the United States Code 
which provides for subject matter and personal jurisdiction of United States courts over 
foreign nations. Id. at 6611. The drafters expected that such a comprehensive jurisdictional 
scheme would "be conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate 
treatment of cases ... may have adverse foreign relations consequences." Id. 
118. Id. at 6606. The State Department would be freed from pressures from foreign 
governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences 
resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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Judicial decisions concerning sovereign immunity are limited 
by the express terms of the Act. 121 The "commercial activity" ex-
ception is of particular importance.122 The drafters of the statute 
did not apply precisely defined wording to the exception, in-
dicating their desire to have it broadly applied.123 Indeed, the 
House Report states: "As the definition indicates, the fact that 
goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used 
for a public purpose is irrelevant: it is the essentially commercial 
nature of an activity or transaction that is critical." 124 Under this 
exception, the courts are prohibited from exercising their discre-
tion by inquiring into the intended use or purpose of the transac-
tions.125 Rather, the courts are directed to apply the restrictive 
"nature of the activity" test in determining a grant of immunity.126 
The drawbacks associated with applying this "test" were con-
sidered by the District Court in JAM v. OPEC. 
VL THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN IAM V. OPEC 
After dismissing IA M's claim against OPEC, the 
121. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1330(a), 90 Stat. 
2890. The legislative history accompanying this section states that the act "set forth the 
sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised 
by foreign states .... " [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6610. "It is intended to preempt 
any other State or Federal law ... for according immunity to foreign sovereigns." Id. 
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). This section defines commercial activity as either a 
"regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The 
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the 
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 
Id. 
Section 1602 goes on to state that "[u]nder international law, states are not immune from 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned .... " 28 
u.s.c. § 1602 (1976). 
123. The drafters of the Act intended that "the courts would have a great deal of 
latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity' for purposes of this bill. It has seem-
ed unwise to attempt an excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were prac-
ticable." [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6615. 
124. Id. at 6605. 
125. See supra note 122. 
126. See supra note 122. The legislative history of the Act gave the following simplistic 
explanation: 
Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equipment for 
its armed forces or to construct a government building constitutes a commercial 
activity. Such contracts should be considered to be commercial contracts, even if 
their ultimate object is to further a public function. 
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6615. Such a broad test affords immunity only when 
the nature of the act is capable of being performed solely by a state and not a person. 
Mehren, supra note 109, at 49. Similarly, an act done solely for profit would be characterized 
as commercial in nature. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6615. 
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organization,121 and the damages claim,128 the District Court con-
sidered the jurisdictional issue under the FSIA.129 In an effort to 
foreclose the immunity defense to OPEC, the plaintiffs relied upon 
the "commercial activity" exception of the Act. 130 Thus, the crucial 
issue became whether the defendant's activities could be charac-
terized as "commercial" within the meaning of the statute.131 
IAM insisted that the Court focus solely on the specific activi-
ty of "price-fixing," 132 which was presumably done for profit and, 
thus, was within the scope of the exception. 133 Instead, the Court 
characterized the defendant's activity as "the establishment by a 
sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal of a 
prime natural resource ... from its territory ."134 Relying on the 
statute's legislative intent, 135 the Court recognized that an activity 
in which only a sovereign may engage is noncommercial. 136 The 
Court concluded that the control over a nation's natural resources, 
in this case oil, was a sovereign act, 137 and a voluntary agreement 
among the member nations to engage in such control remained a 
sovereign act. 138 Accordingly, the Court ruled OPEC's actions as 
127. See supra note 8. 
128. See supra note 29. 
129. 477 F. Supp. 553, 565-69. The District Court acquired subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. 1330(a). Under this section, however, jurisdiction applies only when a 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity. Consequently, the first question the Court ad-
dressed was whether the plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to support the Court's 
jurisdiction. Id. at 565. 
130. The Court reasoned that the exception upon which the plaintiff relies is found in 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), which excepts from immunity "an act outside the territory of the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that act causes a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
131. The Court noted that "[a]n act or activity can be defined broadly, such as 'hiring of 
employees,' an activity carried on by private parties, and thus, 'commercial,' or it can be 
defined narrowly, such as 'employment of diplomatic, civil service or military personnel,' a 
governmental activity." 477 F. Supp at 567. 
132. Id. 
133. See supra note 122. 
134. 477 F. Supp. at 567. To support its position the court relied on international legal 
principles which recognize that "a sovereign state has the sole power to control its natural 
resources." Id. See G.A. Res. 1803, § l(l), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, 2d Comm. 327, 
U.N. Doc. A/C2/5R 850 (1962). Accord, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
G.A. Res. 3281, Ch. II, Art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1974). 
135. 477 F. Supp. at 567. The legislative history of the FSIA limits immunity "to those 
cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or governmental in nature, as op-
posed to acts which are purely commercial in nature or those which private persons normal-
ly perform." [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6613. 
136. See supra note 135. 
137. 477 F. Supp. at 568. 
138. Id. 
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noncommercial and, therefore, entitled to immunity under the 
FSIA.139 
The Court's focusing solely on OPEC's control over its 
natural resources fails to consider whether the means of imple-
menting that control were commercial. Under the FSIA's "nature 
of the activity" test, 140 the Court's reasoning and conclusion appear 
faulty. As IAM pointed out on appeal, the statute requires a court 
to view the nature of the act itself, rather than the sovereign's 
underlying motivations or purpose.141 Indeed, the correctness of 
the District Court's decision based on the FSIA has been the sub-
ject of criticism by numerous commentators.142 
VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
UNDER THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 
The Court of Appeals recognized the dilemma presented by 
an application of restrictive sovereign immunity. Under the FSIA, 
the courts will not refrain from adjudicating a suit arising from a 
sovereign's commercial activities. 143 The statute requires the 
courts to apply an objective "nature of the activity" test to deter-
mine whether the act in question is commercial.144 IAM argued on 
appeal that the District Court's characterization of OPEC's activi-
ty departs from the statute's requirements. 145 Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals recognized that the District Court's characterization of 
OPEC's activity, "the establishment of the terms and conditions 
for the removal of a prime natural resource ... ," 146 was merely the 
purpose behind OPEC's action.147 The act complained of, however, 
139. Id. at 569. See supra note 5. 
140. See supra note 122. 
141. 649 F.2d 1354, 1358. See supra note 14. 
142. See Note, Sovereign Immunity-Jurisdictional Problems Involving the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act and Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust 
Laws, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 835 (1981). Note, Restrictive Immunity and the OPEC 
Cartel: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International 
Association of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 771 (1979-80). Comment, The Suit Against OPEC: Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the 
United States, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 508 (1980). For an alternative view, arguing that the 
decision was correctly decided see, Crocker, Sovereign Immunity and the Suit Against 
OPEC, 12 CASE w. RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (1980). 
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605(a)(2). See supra note 122. 
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
145. 649 F.2d 1354, 1358. 
146. 477 F. Supp. 559, 567. For the rationale applied by the lower court in reaching this 
outcome, see supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
147. 649 F.2d at 1357 n.6. The Court of Appeals distinguished the two tests and 
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was OPEC's conspiracy to fix prices.148 A court, properly applying 
the FSIA's mechanical "nature of the activity" test to the act of 
conspiring to fix prices, could arguably find it to be commercial in 
nature,149 resulting in the subsequent denial of immunity to the 
OPEC nations. 
In reaching its decision, however, the Court of Appeals, like 
the District Court, was cognizant of "the broader implications of 
an antitrust action against the OPEC nations." 150 To these nations, 
oil revenues represented their only significant source of income.151 
This dependence on oil clearly influenced the OPEC nations' at-
tempts to control its production, extraction, and export.152 OPEC's 
acts cannot be simplistically separated into the components of sov-
ereignty or commercial activity, as the FSIA requires. Indeed, the 
District Court noted that OPEC's "price-fixing" activity has a 
significant sovereign component.153 Therefore, a court's assess-
ment of the propriety of OPEC's conspiracy to fix prices would in-
evitably involve a determination as to the validity of the sover-
eign's underlying purpose and motivation.154 The Court of Appe~ls 
recognized that "while the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose 
of a state's action, the act of state doctrine does not." 155 Thus, the 
demonstrated the effects on immunity under each. 
Id. 
Two different tests arose to determine the character of state activity. One focused 
on the purpose of the activity, the other on the nature of the activity. The purpose 
test, which asks whether the act in question was undertaken for sovereign ends, is 
subjective. The nature test, which focuses on the nature of the act itself, is objec-
tive. The purpose test grants broader immunity, since even the most commercial 
activity could have an underlying governmental purpose .... For example, the pur-
chase of furniture is objectively a commercial act. If the furniture is purchased for 
a state embassy, however, under the purpose test, the act is sovereign and im-
munity applies. 
148. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text .supra. 
149. See note 122 supra. The act of conspiring to fix prices is undoubtedly done for pro-
fit and an act which an individual could engage in. Under the FSIA, either finding indicates 
a commercial activity. See supra notes 126, 130, 135 and accompanying text. 
150. 649 F. 2d 1354, 1358. 
151. Id. 
152. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
153. 477 F. Supp. 553, 567. The Court of Appeals also noted that "consideration of their 
sovereignty cannot be separated from their near total dependence on oil." 649 F.2d at 1358. 
154. 649 F .2d at 1358. Similar reasoning was applied by the Second Circuit to render 
the plaintiff's claim non-justiciable under the act of state doctrine in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1977). 
155. 649 F. Supp. at 1360. This Court stated earlier that the motivations of the 
sovereign must be examined for a public interest basis in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals applied this logic 
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Court of Appeals reasoned that, under these circumstances, ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine was warranted, "regardless of 
any commercial component of the activity involved." 156 
To support its application of the act of state defense, the 
Court relied on the theoretical bases underlying the doctrine. 157 
Like the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, the instant court did not rely 
solely on the principle of sovereignty to support its decision. 158 
Rather, the Court of Appeals focused on the doctrine's "constitu-
tional underpinnings- the basic relationship between branches of 
government in a system of separation of powers." 159 The Court's 
reasoning under these principles provides support for its subse-
quent decision. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the principle of separa-
tion of powers requires the courts to assume their primary role as 
interpreters of the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 
Similarly, it requires the President and Congress to assume their 
primary role in the "resolution of political conflict and the adop-
tion of foreign policy ."160 To support its argument, the Court anal-
yzed the institutional limitations of the judiciary in foreign rela-
tions. "The political branches of our government are able to con-
sider the competing economic and political considerations ... of a 
foreign policy issue." 161 Moreover, to achieve foreign policy objec-
tives, the political branches have unique tools, in the form of pro-
tocol, compromise, delay, persuasion and economic sanctions, 
which are methods unavailable to, and inappropriate for, the 
judicial branch.162 
stating: "[W]hen the state qua state acts in the public interest, its sovereignty is asserted. 
The courts must proceed cautiously to avoid an affront to that sovereignty." 649 F.2d at 
1360. 
156. 649 F.2d at 1360. 
157. 649 F.2d at 1358, citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
158. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
159. 376 U.S. 398, 423. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
160. 649 F. 2d at 1359, citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Supreme Court stated: 
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign 
relations are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues frequently 
turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the e~ercise of a discre-
tion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such ques-
tions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's view. 
Id. at 211. 
161. 649 F.2d at 1358. 
162. Id. 
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In contrast, the courts are obligated to simply apply establish-
ed legal principles to the immediate dispute at bar in an apolitical 
context.163 Moreover, the timing of decisions is not based on the 
importance of the issues involved. Instead, a decision may depend 
on the court's caseload and the delaying tactics employed by 
counsel.164 Under these circumstances, the Court reasoned that it 
was inappropriate to engage in piecemeal and ill-timed adjudica-
tion involving the propriety of sovereign acts, at the risk of 
adversely affecting foreign policy .165 
The Court of Appeals also noted other considerations war-
ranting judicial restraint in this case. In an effort to avoid a rigid 
rule of application, the Court adopted the balancing approach sug-
gested in Sabbatino. 166 Recognizing that "some aspects of interna-
tional law touch more sharply on national nerves than do 
others," 167 the Court announced that the "crucial element" is the 
potential for judicial interference with foreign relations. 168 
Relying on earlier cases which "judicially recognized the 
growing world energy crisis," 169 the Court noted that the 
"availability of oil has become a significant factor in international 
relations." 170 Moreover, the record in this case contained extensive 
documentation of the involvement of the political branches with 
the oil question. Under these circumstances, the Court reasoned 
that any judicial determination would be detrimental. 111 Granting 
an injunction against the OPEC nations would insult the OPEC 
states and interfere with the efforts of the political branches to 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. This was the rationale applied by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino. See supra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
166. 649 F.2d at 1360. See supra discussion accompanying notes 54-56. 
167. 649 F.2d at 1360, quoting 376 U.S. at 428. 
168. 649 F.2d at 1360, quoting 549 F.2d at 606. 
169. See Occidental of UMM al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979) (dismissing an action to determine 
rights to oil in the Persian Gulf as raising a non-justiciable political question); Hunt v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) (affirming, under the act of 
state doctrine, dismissal of antitrust claim where the act complained of was part of "a conti-
nuing and broadened confrontation between the East and West in an oil crisis which has im-
plications and complications for transcending those suggested by appellants"). 
170. 649 F.2d at 1360. 
171. Id. at 1361. The Court of Appeals noted that "while the case is formulated as an 
anti-trust action , the granting of any relief would be in effect amount to an order from a 
domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means of allocating and 
profiting from its own valuable natural resources." Id. 
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seek favorable relations with them.112 Conversely, if the Court 
found OPEC's actions legal, this " 'would greatly strengthen the 
bargaining hand' of the OPEC nations in the event that Congress 
or the executive chooses to condemn OPEC's actions." 113 Clearly, 
this case presented a situation where the potential for in-
terference with our foreign relations was overwhelming. 
A further consideration addressed by the Court was the 
availability of internationally-accepted legal principles.174 The 
Court of Appeals noted that there exists "no international consen-
sus condemning cartels, royalties, and production agreements." 175 
Under the Sabbatino balancing test, the complete lack of consen-
sus in international law makes it inappropriate for the judiciary to 
render a decision in this case.176 
The Court of Appeals' reasoning under established legal prin-
ciples provides strong support for its decision to affirm the lower 
Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. Together, the sensitive 
nature of the dispute, the institutional limitations of the judiciary, 
the sovereign component of the acts in question, and the lack of ac-
cepted principles of international law present a situation where 
judicial intervention is inappropriate. The act of state doctrine 
provides a sound basis for the courts to exercise such judicial 
restraint. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In determining whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in antitrust cases, a court must carefully balance two com-
peting interests which arise when a foreign sovereign is involved 
in alleged misconduct. First, a court seeks to effectively enforce 
antitrust policies to protect American economic interests by pro-
scribing conduct deemed anticompetitive. Second, the courts must 
respect the principles of sovereignty, especially when an affront to 
that sovereignty may arise from our ideological preferences for a 
free market economy. The Court of Appeals' balancing approach 
in the OPEC case provided an effective means for determining the 
172. Id. 
173. Id. quoting 376 U.S. at 432. 
17 4. 649 F .2d at 1361. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
175. Id. at 1361. The amici suggested that production quotes and royalties are accepted 
sovereign practices, citing, the Connally Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715; the United States pay-
ment to farmers not to produce wheat; and Japan's voluntary reduction of TV and 
automobile production to maintain prices. Id. n.9. 
176. Id. at 1361. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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weight to be given to these competing interests in this particular 
case. The court's subsequent decision to exercise judicial restraint 
under the act of state doctrine clearly indicates that, under the cir-
cumstances, our foreign policy needs with respect to the OPEC na-
tions outweighed the competing interests of antitrust enforce-
ment. 
Despite the possibility of developing an argument that 
OPEC's price-fixing falls within the commercial exception to the 
FSIA, the District Court was almost certainly correct in holding 
otherwise and dismissing the defendants' claims. An initial con-
sideration is the unlikely possibility of enforcing a decision holding 
the OPEC nations liable for price-fixing. An additional considera-
tion is that an injunction against the OPEC states would result in 
enjoining sovereign acts which allow OPEC members to achieve a 
measure of economic and political independence. Yet, the explicit 
language of the FSIA fails to consider whether the acts in ques-
tion constitute elements central to a sovereign's economic and 
social policy. Indeed, these concerns were specifically rejected by 
the FSIA's drafters as factors to be considered in resolving ques-
tions of immunity. If, however, the judiciary is to accept its assign-
ed role of deciding sovereign immunity questions, and the result-
ing consequences, the courts must consider these factors in cases 
which involve the commercial acts of sovereign nations. If not, a 
primary function of sovereign immunity, the prevention of unnec-
essary conflicts among nations, will be severely curtailed. Because 
these considerations cannot be read into the statute's definition of 
"commercial activities" in appropriate cases, these concerns are 
properly addressed by the act of state doctrine. 
The OPEC decision's major impact is its reaffirmation of the 
act of state doctrine as a prudential principle designed to avoid 
judicial determinations in politically sensitive areas. To argue that 
this case involves a sensitive issue is a gross understatement. In-
deed, it is plausible that the suit against OPEC is the type of case 
for which the Supreme Court must have intended the act of state 
doctrine to be exercised. The doctrine recognizes both the institu-
tional limitation of the judiciary and the expertise of the other 
branches of government in foreign affairs. Because the act of state 
doctrine addresses concerns central to our system of government, 
it must necessarily remain a part of our jurisprudence. The OPEC 
decision assures this result. 
Joseph J. Wielebinski 
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